


# **Macroprudential Policy: Safeguarding Financial Stability**

**Dr. Jens Reich, Deutsche Bundesbank, DG Financial Stability**

**Berlin – October 24th, 2019**

# Financial crises are costly for the real economy...

Change real economic indicators during standard recessions and recessions that were preceded by a credit boom, 150 countries 1970-2011.



...have long and lasting effects on public finances...

### Which measures effected public debt more intensely in Germany?


1. Support of the banking sector during and after the financial crisis.
2. Measures teaken in the context of the european government debt crisis.
3. The impact of both were almost identical.

*To answer the questions please open [www.menti.com](https://www.menti.com) and enter the following Code: 10 59 94.*

[Results](#)

## ...have long and lasting effects on public finances...

Debt impact of stabilization measures taken in connection with the financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis.



# **Macprudential Policy: Safeguarding Financial Stability**

- I. Financial stability**
- II. Macprudential policy**

# Macprudential Policy: Safeguarding Financial Stability

I. **Financial stability**

II. **Macprudential policy**

# **Systemic risks and financial (in)stability**

Definition and sources of systemic risk.


## **We consider the financial system stable if**

- it provides its functions while market participants constantly adjust to changing economic conditions.

## **A stable financial system**

- is able to absorb idiosyncratic and macroeconomic shocks – in particular in times of economic upheaval.
- mitigates contagion and feedback effects, i.e. the FS neither triggers an economic contraction nor amplifies an exogenous shock.

## **A financial system is instable if shocks hit vulnerabilities.**



### The Simple Solution to Traffic

8.797.698 Aufrufe



CGP Grey

Am 31.08.2016 veröffentlicht


The way we can make traffic disappear.

Discuss this video: <http://reddit.com/r/cpggrey>

Brought to you in part by: <http://www.audible.com/grey>

# Systemic risks and financial (in)stability

Definition and sources of systemic risk.







# Systemic risks and financial (in)stability

## Definition and sources of systemic risk.

Systemic risk arises from **(structural) vulnerabilities of systemic risk**:

- excessive risk taking of large banks and implicit government guarantees for these institutions („too big to fail“),
- the nature of the financial system as an interconnected network („too connected to fail“),
- many banks making the same kinds of bad bets („too many to fail“);

**Cyclical vulnerabilities of systemic risk** (excessive credit growth); and

**vulnerabilities with structural and cyclical elements**:

- systematic underestimation of (in particular credit) risk,
- overvaluation of assets and loan collateral, e.g. real estate, or
- excessive period transformation (in particular interest rate risk).

# No traffic...



# ... or make traffic safe again.



**safety distance**



**speed limits**



# Macprudential Policy: Safeguarding Financial Stability

**I. Financial stability**

**II. Macprudential policy**

# Macprudential Policy: Safeguarding Financial Stability

I. Financial stability

II. **Macprudential policy**

# Macprudential Policy

...and its toolkit.

## Financial Stability

### Vulnerabilities

credit growth  
and leverage

maturity/liquidity  
transformation

exposure  
concentration

SIIs, incentives/  
moral hazard

financial market  
infrastructures

## Financial System

Banks

Insurer

Markets

Infrastructur

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### 3 main categories of macroprudential instruments:

1. **soft**: communication
2. **intermediate**: warnings and recommendations („formal“ communication)
3. **hard**: interventions (e.g. capita-related instruments, sustainability-related instruments, liquidity and funding ratios)

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# Macroprudential Policy

...and its toolkit: **communication**.



## Key messages:

- **Cyclical risks have built up in the German financial system during the long period of growth and low interest rates:**
  - Potential underestimation of credit risk
  - Potential overvaluation of assets and loan collateral, e.g. real estate
  - Interest rate risk
- **If economic conditions deteriorate unexpectedly, these risks may occur at the same time, reinforce each other, and lead to herding behavior in the financial system (aggravating negative developments).**
  - The existing buffers may not be enough to limit contagion effects within the financial system or negative feedback effects to the real economy.
- **Now is the time to build sufficient buffers against unexpected developments.**

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
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\* Systemic risk buffer.

\*\* In certain cases can be the sum of SII & systemic risk buffer.

\*\*\* Assumed upper bounds (values can be higher).

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
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# **Macroprudential Policy: Safeguarding Financial Stability**

**Dr. Jens Reich, Deutsche Bundesbank, DG Financial Stability**

**Frankfurt - July 17th, 2019**

# Macroprudential Policy: Safeguarding Financial Stability

**Backup**

# Macroprudential Policy

...and its toolkit.

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
Markets

Infrastructur

BCBS: L=2; CCCB=0 and H=10; CCCB=2,5

### Countercyclical capital buffer for Germany


Quarterly data



“Operationalising the countercyclical capital buffer” ESRB Occasional Paper Series No. 5 / June 2014


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...and its toolkit: **warnings and recommendations.**




# Macroprudential Policy

...and its coordination in Germany ... in its European context.



# Macroprudential Policy

...and its coordination in Germany ... in its European context.



# Macprudential Policy

...and its toolkit: **warnings and recommendations.**

## AUSSCHUSS FÜR FINANZSTABILITÄT

### Empfehlung

vom 30. Juni 2015

zu neuen Instrumenten für die Regulierung der Darlehensvergabe  
zum Bau oder Erwerb von Wohnimmobilien

AFS/2015/1

### Erster Teil

Der Ausschuss für Finanzstabilität (im Folgenden „Ausschuss“) hat auf der Grundlage von § 3 Absatz 2 des Gesetzes zur Überwachung der Finanzstabilität vom 28. November 2012 (BGBl. I, S. 2369), geändert durch Artikel 21 des Gesetzes vom 4. Juli 2013 (BGBl. I, S. 1961) (im Folgenden „Finanzstabilitätsgesetz“), folgende Empfehlungen beschlossen:

#### Empfehlung A – Neue Instrumente für die Regulierung der Darlehensvergabe zum Bau oder Erwerb von Wohnimmobilien

Der Bundesregierung wird empfohlen,

1. die Schaffung von Rechtsgrundlagen zu initiieren, die der Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (im Folgenden „Bundesanstalt“) die Befugnis einräumen, unter grundsätzlicher Berücksichtigung etwaiger einschlägiger Empfehlungen des Ausschusses gewerblichen Darlehensgebern nachfolgend aufgeführte Beschränkungen bei der Vergabe von grundpfandrechtlich besicherten Darlehen zum Bau oder zum Erwerb von im Inland belegenen Wohnimmobilien aufzuerlegen, wenn dies erforderlich ist, um einer drohenden Störung der Funktionsfähigkeit des Finanzsystems oder einer Gefahr für die Finanzstabilität in Deutschland entgegenzuwirken:
  - a. Vorgabe einer Obergrenze für den Quotienten aus dem gesamten Fremdkapitalvolumen einer Wohnimmobilienfinanzierung und dem Marktwert der als Sicherheit verwendeten Wohnimmobilien zum Zeitpunkt der Darlehensvergabe (im Folgenden „Kreditvolumen-Immobilienwert-Relation“);

1

**Recommendation** to the German government to establish a legal foundation for the creation of **borrower-based macroprudential instruments for the housing sector:**

- capping the LTV ratio
- setting an amortisation requirement
- capping the debt service to income ratio
- capping the debt to income (DTI) ratio

# Macroprudential Policy

## ...and its toolkit: warnings and recommendations.

Empfehlung  
des  
Ausschusses für Finanzstabilität  
vom 27. Mai 2019  
zur Erhöhung des antizyklischen Kapitalpuffers  
AFS/2019/1

### A) Empfehlung zur Quote für den antizyklischen Kapitalpuffer

Der Ausschuss für Finanzstabilität (im Folgenden „Ausschuss“) hat auf der Grundlage von § 3 Absatz 2 des Gesetzes zur Überwachung der Finanzstabilität vom 28. November 2012 (BGBl. I, S. 2369), zuletzt geändert durch Artikel 24 Absatz 35 des Gesetzes vom 23. Juni 2017 (BGBl. I S. 1693) (im Folgenden „Finanzstabilitätsgesetz“ oder „FinStabG“), folgende Empfehlung beschlossen:

Der Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (im Folgenden „Bundesanstalt“) wird empfohlen,

gemäß § 10d Absatz 3 Satz 2 des Kreditwesengesetzes (KWG) die Quote für den inländischen antizyklischen Kapitalpuffer in Höhe von 0,25 Prozent des nach Artikel 92 Absatz 3 der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 575/2013 ermittelten Gesamtforderungs Betrags ab dem 3. Quartal 2019 festzulegen.

**Recommendation** to the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority to increase the countercyclical capital buffer from 0% to 0,25%, due to:

- low interest rates and growth: credit risks might be underestimated; resilience of the financial system could be overstated,
- revaluation of assets, the value of collateral might be overestimated,
- interest rate risk and credit risk could occur simultaneously,
- risks can be mutually reinforcing in the financial system.